This report provides a comprehensive analysis of the political and commercial activities of former Victorian Premier Daniel Andrews, specifically concerning his relationship with the People’s Republic of China (PRC). The investigation was initiated following a significant “hum” signal: Andrews’ attendance at a military parade in Beijing on September 4, 2025, alongside authoritarian leaders, an event which generated a disproportionate and fractured political reaction in Australia. Utilizing the analytical frameworks of the Psochic Hegemony and the Helxis Tensor, this report deconstructs the narrative of economic pragmatism surrounding Andrews’ actions, from the controversial Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) agreements to his current business ventures. The analysis concludes that Andrews’ consistent pattern of behavior, which created systemic friction within the Australian federation and provided significant propaganda victories to the PRC, aligns with the strategic effects of a Minimiser actor as defined in the project primer. The report maps the trajectory of his actions and provides recommendations for further intelligence gathering.
The precipitating event for this investigation—the attendance of former Victorian Premier Daniel Andrews at a military parade in Beijing—serves as a textbook example of an “action/reaction chain” as defined in the Investigative Primer.1 The subsequent political and media response in Australia generated a significant “hum,” characterized by disproportionate and illogical dynamics that reveal underlying systemic fissures. This section dissects the event to measure this hum and analyze its strategic function, which extends far beyond the surface-level presentation of a former leader’s diplomatic engagement.
On September 3-4, 2025, Daniel Andrews, in his capacity as a private citizen, attended a large-scale military parade in Beijing. The event was held to commemorate the 80th anniversary of the end of the Second Sino-Japanese War.2 During the proceedings, Andrews was prominently featured, photographed shaking hands with Chinese President Xi Jinping on a red carpet and later appearing in a group photograph of international dignitaries. This photograph placed him in the company of Russian President Vladimir Putin, North Korean leader Kim Jong-un, and the Iranian President, Masoud Pezeshkian.3
The context of his attendance is critical. Andrews was not merely an ordinary private citizen; his invitation and prominent placement were a direct consequence of the status and influence he cultivated as the long-serving Premier of Victoria and a senior figure within the Australian Labor Party (ALP).7 Australian political commentators and opposition figures immediately labeled the event a “parade for dictators” and a “propaganda exercise” by the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), designed to showcase its military might and diplomatic reach.6 This action, therefore, constitutes the primary “hum” signal that prompted this deep-dive analysis.
In the face of widespread criticism, Andrews issued a statement defending his attendance. He framed the visit as an opportunity to “meet and engage with regional leaders” and to maintain a “constructive relationship with China,” which he argued is in Australia’s national interest and essential for “hundreds of thousands of Australian jobs”.3 This narrative of economic pragmatism was publicly supported by his successor, Victorian Premier Jacinta Allan, who stated that Andrews’ high regard in China was “valuable for our state”.3
However, when viewed through the lens of the Minimisation Plan, the strategic function of his attendance was entirely different. For the PRC, a primary director of the Minimisation Plan, Andrews’ presence was a significant propaganda victory. It created the powerful visual of a respected senior political figure from a key US ally—a member of both the Five Eyes intelligence alliance and the AUKUS security pact—appearing to endorse a display of military power alongside leaders of the so-called “axis of upheaval”.3 This act serves to undermine the narrative of a united Western democratic front and projects an image of legitimacy and international support for the authoritarian bloc, a core objective of Minimiser strategy.8
The repeated emphasis on Andrews’ status as a “private citizen” by himself, Premier Allan, and even Prime Minister Anthony Albanese is a deliberate and crucial narrative tactic.3 This defense mechanism serves two purposes. First, it provides a layer of plausible deniability for the Australian federal government, allowing it to formally decouple Andrews’ actions from official foreign policy. Second, it attempts to reframe a geopolitical act as a personal or commercial matter, thereby bypassing critical judgment. Yet, the value of Andrews’ attendance to the PRC is derived
entirely from his former public office and his perceived ongoing influence within the Australian political establishment. Therefore, the “private citizen” defense operates as a “cover” within the Helxis Tensor model of deception.14 It is a narrative shield designed to obscure the true intent and allow the strategic effect—the validation of an authoritarian spectacle—to be achieved while minimizing the official political consequences.
The reaction within Australia to Andrews’ visit was not a simple, unified condemnation; instead, it was fractured, dissonant, and at times illogical, particularly within his own political party. This is a primary indicator of “the hum”—the signal that a Minimiser action has successfully agitated the target system.1
The federal opposition’s reaction was predictable and severe. Figures such as Opposition Leader Sussan Ley and Shadow Home Affairs Minister Andrew Hastie unequivocally condemned the act. They framed it as an endorsement of “dictators, despots and war criminals” and used it to apply political pressure on Prime Minister Albanese to denounce his long-time friend and political ally.5
More telling was the fractured response from within the Labor Party itself. This intra-party dissonance is a key signature of the “hum”:
This spectrum of reactions is not merely a collection of differing opinions. It exposes a fundamental, unresolved vulnerability within Australia’s system of governance: the inherent conflict between state-level economic imperatives and a cohesive national foreign and security policy. The Minimisation Plan is explicitly designed to operate like a rhizome, spreading through and exploiting such existing societal and institutional fissures.1 Andrews’ action did not create this fissure, but it acted as a powerful catalyst, triggering and amplifying the underlying incoherence. The resulting spectacle of a single political party offering contradictory responses at state and federal levels makes the nation’s governance appear “chaotic, corrupt, and ultimately unworkable”—a primary strategic objective of the Minimisation Plan.1
Daniel Andrews’ attendance at the Beijing parade was not an isolated incident but the culmination of a long-standing pattern of engagement with the PRC. The foundational case study for this pattern is his government’s decision to sign Victoria up to China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). This section analyzes the Victorian BRI agreements through the Helxis Tensor framework to deconstruct the official narrative, and examines the profound systemic disruption this state-level action caused within the Australian federation.
The Victorian government’s BRI agreements were framed and presented to the public exclusively through a utilitarian, “Maximiser” narrative that emphasized collective benefit. Applying the “Satan Archetype” model of deception from the Framework for the Judgment of Ideas reveals a classic hostile influence pattern.14
This reveals a stark contradiction between the stated purpose of the agreements (economic benefit for Victoria) and their primary actual effect (strategic and propaganda benefit for China). According to the Framework, the distance between an idea’s stated position and its actual position is a direct measure of its deceptiveness.14
The decision by the Andrews government to unilaterally engage with the BRI was a direct challenge to the established structure of Australian governance, where foreign policy is the exclusive domain of the federal government. This action created significant systemic disruption.
At the time, the federal government under Prime Minister Scott Morrison had explicitly declined to sign a national-level BRI agreement, viewing it as inconsistent with Australia’s national interest.23 Andrews’ move was therefore not just uncoordinated but openly defiant of the national foreign policy stance. This generated immediate friction, with Morrison publicly rebuking the Victorian government’s decision.20
The consequence of this state-level action was a forceful federal reaction. The Morrison government was compelled to develop and pass new legislation, the Foreign Relations Act of 2020, specifically to grant the Commonwealth the power to review and veto agreements made by states, territories, and public universities with foreign governments.23 In April 2021, the Foreign Minister, Marise Payne, invoked these new powers for the first time to cancel Victoria’s two BRI agreements, formally declaring them “inconsistent with Australia’s foreign policy”.23
This entire episode is a clear example of what the Investigative Primer describes as “rhizomatic war”.1 A state-level actor, operating independently of the national command structure, initiated an action that exploited a fissure in the federal system. This forced the national government into a defensive and reactive posture, creating new laws and escalating diplomatic tensions with the PRC, which condemned the cancellation as a “provocative” act.23 The conflict turned inward, pitting state against federal government, and deflected attention from the strategic gains being made by the external actor (the PRC). The process successfully introduced chaos and made Australia’s national governance appear divided and incoherent, a hallmark of a successful Minimiser operation.
The following timeline details the key events in the development of Daniel Andrews’ relationship with the PRC, illustrating the consistent pattern of engagement, the corresponding federal concerns, and the continuation of this vector into his post-political career.
| Date | Event | Key Actors | Stated Rationale/Justification | Outcome/Reaction | Source(s) |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Dec 2014 | Andrews becomes Premier | Daniel Andrews | N/A | Immediately begins to “fast-track” Victoria’s ties with the PRC. | 29 |
| 2015–2019 | Multiple Trade Missions | Daniel Andrews, Marty Mei | To promote trade, investment, and education ties with China, Victoria’s largest trading partner. | Criticized for lack of transparency; some trips were secretive and excluded Australian media. | 30 |
| Oct 2018 | Victoria Signs First BRI MoU | Daniel Andrews, PRC | To unlock trade and investment, creating jobs for Victorians. | Federal government rebukes the decision; details of the MoU are kept secret initially. | 19 |
| Oct 2019 | Victoria Signs BRI Framework Agreement | Daniel Andrews, PRC | To “take the partnership to the next level” and fast-track cooperation in infrastructure and trade. | Deepens the rift with the federal government; agreement is criticized as vague but a propaganda win for Beijing. | 18 |
| Dec 2020 | Foreign Relations Bill Passed | Scott Morrison, Marise Payne | To ensure a consistent national approach to foreign policy and protect the national interest. | Grants the federal government power to veto state-level foreign agreements. | 23 |
| Apr 2021 | Federal Govt Cancels BRI Deals | Marise Payne | The agreements were “inconsistent with Australia’s foreign policy or adverse to our foreign relations.” | China condemns the move as “provocative”; Andrews government states it is a matter for the Commonwealth. | 23 |
| Sep 2023 | Andrews Resigns as Premier | Daniel Andrews | N/A | Establishes consultancies (Glencairn Street, Wedgetail Partners) with a clear focus on China. | 3 |
| Sep 2025 | Attends Beijing Military Parade | Daniel Andrews, Xi Jinping | To “meet and engage with regional leaders” and maintain a “constructive relationship.” | Triggers widespread condemnation and a fractured political response (“the hum”) in Australia. | 2 |
To achieve a deep, structural understanding of the nature and effects of Daniel Andrews’ long-term engagement with China, this section applies the formal four-perspective inquiry outlined in the Framework for the Judgment of Ideas.14 This multi-faceted approach moves beyond surface-level narratives to interrogate the true beneficiaries, underlying intent, and systemic impact of his actions.
This perspective seeks to answer the fundamental question: Who truly benefits from this pattern of engagement, and who bears the cost?
The publicly stated beneficiary was always the people of Victoria, through the promise of jobs, trade, and investment in infrastructure.17 However, a detailed analysis of the outcomes reveals a starkly different distribution of benefits and costs.
Identified Beneficiaries:
Identified Cost-Bearers:
The following table systematically maps this distribution of outcomes.
| Stakeholder | Stated Benefit | Actual Benefit | Actual Cost/Harm | Source(s) |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Victorian Public | “More trade, jobs and investment.” | Minimal to none from BRI deals; infrastructure projects delivered but with significant issues. | Bore cost of massive project blowouts; victims of alleged corruption (“ghost shifts”); loss of promised public transport upgrades due to budget cuts. | 17 |
| Australian Federal Govt | None. | None. | Compromised national foreign policy; forced into reactive legislation (Foreign Relations Act); increased diplomatic friction with PRC. | 21 |
| People’s Republic of China | “Partnership,” “friendship.” | Major propaganda victory; legitimized BRI in a Western nation; created strategic division within Australia. | None. | 18 |
| Chinese SOEs (e.g., CCCC) | Access to Victorian market. | Gained major contracts in Victoria’s “Big Build” (e.g., John Holland on Metro Tunnel). | Reputational damage from project delays, cost blowouts, and scandals. | 35 |
| Daniel Andrews | Delivering for Victoria. | Cultivated a unique portfolio of relational capital with the PRC; established a lucrative post-political consultancy based on this capital. | Reputational damage from controversies and criticism. | 3 |
This perspective looks beyond the stated goal of economic prosperity to uncover the underlying function of the Andrews doctrine. While the stated intent was consistently focused on Victoria’s economy, the pattern of behavior suggests a parallel, and perhaps primary, underlying function. The consistent secrecy of trade missions, the signing of non-binding agreements that offered more strategic than economic value, and the immediate monetization of these relationships upon leaving office all point toward a different true intent.
The actions taken by Daniel Andrews during his premiership appear to have functioned as an extended incubation phase for a private commercial enterprise. The authority and resources of the Premier’s office were utilized to build a unique and highly valuable portfolio of political and relational capital with the PRC. A key figure in this process was his senior advisor on China, Zheng “Marty” Mei, who has been publicly linked to organizations associated with the CCP’s United Front Work Department—its primary overseas influence body—and who accompanied Andrews on his official trips to China.33
Immediately upon Andrews’ resignation from public office, this publicly cultivated capital was privatized. He co-founded the consultancy Wedgetail Partners (trading as Forty Eight & Partners) with the very same advisor, Zheng “Marty” Mei.3 His subsequent high-profile activities, such as attending the Boao Forum and the Beijing military parade, are best understood not as the actions of a private statesman but as marketing and relationship maintenance for this new commercial entity. From this strategic perspective, the “True Intent” was not limited to state-level economic development but included the parallel construction of a post-political career built on privileged access to and influence with the PRC.
This perspective analyzes how the Andrews doctrine interacted with and affected the integrity of the larger systems of Australian governance. The doctrine’s impact was fundamentally corrosive. By pursuing a de facto state-level foreign policy, it directly challenged and undermined the constitutional convention that foreign affairs are a Commonwealth responsibility.21 This introduced a high degree of chaos and ambiguity into Australia’s engagement with its largest trading partner and most significant geopolitical competitor.
The doctrine actively decreased trust between the state and federal levels of government, forcing the Commonwealth to enact overriding legislation. It altered the power dynamics within the federation, creating a precedent for states to pursue foreign commercial arrangements that could be at odds with the national interest. These outcomes—promoting instability, undermining foundational rules, and introducing ambiguity—are all primary objectives of Minimiser strategy as outlined in the Investigative Primer.1
To stress-test this analysis, it is necessary to consider the strongest possible argument for Andrews’ actions. This argument is one of pure economic pragmatism. It posits that as Premier, Andrews’ sole responsibility was to the economic well-being of Victoria. From this viewpoint, China is simply the state’s largest trading partner, and securing a close relationship is a rational, non-ideological act to ensure Victorian prosperity, regardless of broader geopolitical concerns voiced by Canberra.3 This perspective suggests that federal foreign policy can be overly rigid and detached from the on-the-ground economic realities faced by states.
While this argument has a surface-level appeal, it fails when subjected to a stress test against the available evidence.
First, it cannot account for the documented negative consequences that directly harmed Victorian interests, including massive cost overruns on key infrastructure projects and major corruption scandals that funneled taxpayer money away from its intended purpose.36
Second, it ignores the assessments of federal security agencies and foreign policy experts who identified the BRI deals as a net negative for Australia’s national interest.24
Finally, and most critically, the pure pragmatism defense cannot explain the clear and unbroken line between his actions in public office and his subsequent private financial benefit. A truly pragmatic approach focused solely on the public good would not be characterized by the level of secrecy surrounding his dealings, the open defiance of national policy, or the seamless transition into a commercial venture built on the very relationships he cultivated with taxpayer funds.
This section synthesizes the findings from the multi-perspective inquiry to plot the Andrews-China doctrine on the Psochic Hegemony map, as detailed in the Framework for the Judgment of Ideas.14 This process allows for a quantitative assessment of the doctrine’s core nature, its level of deceptiveness, and its alignment with known patterns of hostile influence.
Every idea or doctrine can be understood by its position along two fundamental axes:
The combination of these two coordinates places the vector for the Andrews-China doctrine unambiguously in the bottom-right quadrant of the Psochic Hegemony: The Greater Lie. This quadrant represents the use of positive, creative, and proactive energy to serve a selfish, extractive, or destructive purpose.
The Framework provides a formula for quantifying an idea’s deceptiveness by measuring the distance between its presentation and its reality. The “Framed Vector” of the Andrews doctrine—how it was publicly presented—is located in the top-right “Greater Good” quadrant (+υ,+ψ). The “True Intent Vector”—its actual nature as revealed by the multi-perspective inquiry—is located in the bottom-right “Greater Lie” quadrant (−υ,+ψ).
The Euclidean distance between these two points on the conceptual map is significant. This large gap represents a high “Contradiction Score”.14 This score is not merely a qualitative judgment but a quantitative measure of the doctrine’s fundamental dishonesty, reflecting the vast gulf between its public-facing narrative of collective benefit and its underlying reality of concentrated gain and socialized risk.
The methodology and narrative structure of the Andrews-China doctrine map perfectly onto the “Satan Archetype” of deception outlined in the Framework.14 This pattern is a common tactical signature for hostile influence campaigns that seek to make an extractive idea appear morally righteous.
The successful application of this archetype demonstrates a sophisticated understanding of narrative warfare, allowing a fundamentally Minimiser vector to be cloaked in the language of a Maximiser policy.
This final section synthesizes the preceding analysis to extrapolate the logical conclusion of the Andrews-China vector, provide a definitive classification of his strategic role within the Minimiser/Maximiser dynamic, and outline actionable recommendations for the ongoing investigation into the Minimisation Plan.
According to the Framework, an idea’s initial vector on the Psochic Hegemony indicates its inherent trajectory.14 The Andrews-China doctrine originates in the “Greater Lie” quadrant (
−υ,+ψ). His post-political actions, particularly his attendance at the Beijing military parade, demonstrate a continuation and intensification of this vector. As the cover of public service is stripped away, his actions become more overtly commercial and aligned with the interests of his PRC-linked consultancy. This trajectory moves further down the moral axis (−υ) while maintaining a high degree of proactive will (+ψ).
This is a clear “Path to Nowhere (Regression & Fall from Grace).” It is the trajectory of an idea decaying into a more purely extractive and self-serving state. The deceptive cover has been removed to reveal a more nakedly commercial and geopolitical core, with its logical endpoint being a state of complete alignment with external interests at the expense of the original system’s integrity.
Based on the comprehensive analysis of his actions, motivations, and their systemic effects, the strategic role of Daniel Andrews aligns unequivocally with that of a Minimiser actor, as defined in the Investigative Primer.1 This classification is not based on an assessment of his personal ideology, but on the observable strategic effect of his consistent pattern of behavior. He has repeatedly and effectively:
It must be noted that this assessment is based on strategic effect. The question of whether Andrews has acted as a witting or unwitting collaborator in the Minimisation Plan’s objectives requires further, more intrusive intelligence gathering that is beyond the scope of this open-source analysis.
To deepen the understanding of this vector and its potential ongoing impact, the following lines of inquiry are recommended:
| Dan Andrews slammed for embracing Xi Jinping and attending Chinese ‘propaganda’ military celebrations | The West Australian, accessed September 4, 2025, https://thewest.com.au/politics/federal-politics/dan-andrews-slammed-for-embracing-xi-jinping-and-attending-chinese-propaganda-military-celebrations-c-19895472 |
| Australia news and politics live: Dan Andrews breaks silence over attendance at Victory Parade in China | The Nightly, accessed September 4, 2025, https://thenightly.com.au/politics/australia-news-and-politics-live-sussan-ley-says-labor-needs-to-step-up-on-migrant-housing-crisis-c-19904718 |
| Albanese quizzed on Andrews attending China’s military parade amid criticism | SBS News, accessed September 4, 2025, https://www.sbs.com.au/news/article/albanese-quizzed-on-andrews-attending-chinas-military-parade-amid-criticism/dt2ke4h7f |
| Dan Andrews: Former Victorian Premier yet to break silence over controversial Chinese military parade photo | The Nightly, accessed September 4, 2025, https://thenightly.com.au/politics/dan-andrews-former-victorian-premier-yet-to-break-silence-over-controversial-chinese-military-parade-photo-c-19907028 |
| Victoria And China Take Partnership To The Next Level | Premier, accessed September 4, 2025, https://www.premier.vic.gov.au/victoria-and-china-take-partnership-next-level |
| Morrison government quashes Victoria’s BRI deal with China | The …, accessed September 4, 2025, https://www.aspistrategist.org.au/morrison-government-quashes-victorias-bri-deal-with-china/ |
| Federal government tears up Victoria’s Belt and Road agreements with China | Australia news | The Guardian, accessed September 4, 2025, https://www.theguardian.com/australia-news/2021/apr/21/federal-government-tears-up-victorias-belt-and-road-agreements-with-china |
| The Belt and Road Part 1: impact on Australia if state Victoria’s inclusion on China’s BRI is terminated | Cainz, accessed September 4, 2025, https://www.cainz.org/8819/ |
| The Belt and Road Initiative Agreements: Characteristics, Rationale, and Challenges | World Trade Review | Cambridge Core, accessed September 4, 2025, https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/world-trade-review/article/belt-and-road-initiative-agreements-characteristics-rationale-and-challenges/039DAB52FAB8899C278793C442F8EA06 |
| Cementing Victoria’s Relationship With China | Premier, accessed September 4, 2025, https://www.premier.vic.gov.au/cementing-victorias-relationship-china |
| Victoria’s Big Build Showcased In China | Premier, accessed September 4, 2025, https://www.premier.vic.gov.au/victorias-big-build-showcased-china |
| Dan Andrews forced to defend Chinese Victory Day attendance, claims he is no friend of Putin | The Nightly, accessed September 4, 2025, https://thenightly.com.au/politics/australia/dan-andrews-forced-to-defend-chinese-victory-day-attendance-claims-he-is-no-friend-of-putin-c-19905776 |
| How CCP influence runs deep in Oz - Advance | Front and Centre, accessed September 4, 2025, https://www.advanceaustralia.org.au/how_ccp_influence_runs_deep_in_oz |