The period following Russia's invasion of Ukraine witnessed a sharp, quantifiable escalation in the tempo and nature of joint Sino-Russian military activities in the Indo-Pacific. This shift represented a deliberate campaign to create a credible and persistent military threat against Taiwan. Analysis of joint military exercises reveals a dramatic increase in frequency and a fundamental change in focus. Of the over 90 joint exercises conducted since 2003, nearly one-third have occurred since February 2022, with a clear evolution from earlier land-based counter-terrorism drills to a clear emphasis on naval and aerial power projection directly relevant to a Taiwan conflict scenario [1].
| Year | Exercise Name / Type | Location(s) | Strategic Significance | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2022 | Vostok 2022 | Sea of Japan, Russian Far East | Large-scale strategic command exercise involving naval and air forces, signaling high-level coordination [1]. | |
| 2022 | Joint Sea 2022 | East China Sea | Annual naval drill focused on joint blockade and anti-submarine warfare operations near Taiwan [1]. | |
| 2023 | Northern/Interaction-2023 | Sea of Japan | Focused on joint maritime patrol, sea and air escort, and deterrence operations [1]. | |
| 2024 | Joint Naval Patrol | Arctic Ocean | First-ever joint naval and coast guard patrol in the Arctic, opening a new front for strategic competition [1]. | |
| 2024 | Joint Aerial Patrol | Sea of Japan, East China Sea | Multiple patrols, including one that entered the US air defense identification zone, directly challenging US presence [1]. | |
| 2024 | Ocean-2024 | Global (Pacific, Atlantic, Arctic, etc.) | China's participation in Russia's largest naval exercise since the Soviet era, demonstrating global reach and interoperability [1]. |
This calibrated military pressure from the Sino-Russian axis has elicited a direct and massive financial response from the United States, creating a significant and sustained resource drain. A direct causal link can be drawn between the post-2022 escalation in the Taiwan Strait and the substantial growth of US defense budgets allocated to the region. The primary instrument for this spending has been the Pacific Deterrence Initiative (PDI). The Pentagon's budget request for the PDI grew to a record $9.9 billion for FY2025. Demonstrating a sense of urgency, the US Congress has consistently authorized funding far exceeding these requests, approving a total of $14.71 billion for the PDI in FY2024—over 60% more than the Pentagon had asked for [2, 3].
This funding surge is directly mirrored in the rapid acceleration of US arms transfers to Taiwan. From the beginning of 2022 to early 2025, the executive branch notified Congress of over $8.3 billion in potential Foreign Military Sales (FMS) to Taiwan [4]. This dynamic creates a highly asymmetric return on investment for the Sino-Russian partnership; for the relatively low operational cost of conducting joint exercises, they compel the United States to engage in a multi-billion dollar annual cycle of high-end procurement and infrastructure development, a clear strategy of economic attrition.
| Fiscal Year | Pacific Deterrence Initiative (PDI) Funding | Major Arms Sales to Taiwan (FMS Notified) | Other Key Transfers to Taiwan | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2022 | $7.1 Billion (Authorized) [3] | $1.1 Billion (Harpoon, Sidewinder missiles, Radar Support) [4] | $100 Million (Patriot Support) [4] | |
| 2023 | $11.5 Billion (Authorized) [3] | $619 Million (F-16 Munitions), $500 Million (F-16 IRST) [4] | $345 Million (PDA), $80 Million (FMF) [4] | |
| 2024 | $14.71 Billion (Authorized) [3] | $1.98 Billion (NASAMS, Radars), $360 Million (Drones) [4] | $2 Billion (FMF), $1.9 Billion (Replenishment) [4] | |
| 2025 | $9.9 Billion (Requested) [3] | $295 Million (C4, Gun Mounts) [4] | $11 Billion (INDOPACOM Unfunded Priorities) [3] | |
| Total (Approx.) | >$43 Billion | >$4.8 Billion | >$5.8 Billion |
The Minimisation Plan is not limited to the bilateral Sino-Russian relationship. Its architects are actively expanding their coalition by co-opting other state actors who share a common interest in challenging the US-led order.
North Korea has been integrated as a key logistical and strategic asset, serving as a vast munitions depot for Russia's high-attrition war in Ukraine. Since late 2023, North Korea has become Russia's primary foreign arms supplier, shipping an estimated 4 to 12 million 152mm artillery shells and other munitions [5, 6]. Pyongyang has also deployed thousands of troops to fight for Russia in Ukraine [7]. In exchange, Russia has provided vital economic aid and advanced military technology, a partnership formalized in the June 2024 "Treaty on Comprehensive Strategic Partnership," which includes a mutual defense clause [7].
Parallel to this, the plan has cultivated a southern flank through the strategic integration of Iran. The military dimension of the Iran-Russia partnership was forged during their joint intervention in Syria and became critical after 2022, with Tehran becoming a key supplier of low-cost but effective unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs), such as the Shahed-136, and potentially ballistic missiles to Moscow [8]. Economically, Iran has been drawn firmly into China's orbit via the Iran-China 25-year Cooperation Program, which reportedly involves up to $400 billion in Chinese investment [8].
This evidence points to the construction of a multi-layered, decentralized military-industrial network perfectly suited for a long war of attrition. There is a clear division of labor: Russia is the frontline "battering ram". China provides the high-tech, dual-use components like semiconductors that keep Russia's defense industry alive despite sanctions. North Korea provides the low-cost, high-volume consumables like artillery shells. Iran provides asymmetric, cost-effective force multipliers like drones [8].
The integration of Iran into this network has a critical systemic impact, extending the Minimisation Plan's vectors of influence directly into the Middle East and placing a key US ally, Israel, in a complex strategic dilemma. Iran does not act alone; its role as an asymmetric warfare specialist for the Minimiser axis is executed through its own network of proxies, including Hezbollah in Lebanon, Hamas in Gaza, and the Houthis in Yemen [9]. The flow of Iranian weapons, funding, and training to these groups serves to create a persistent, multi-front threat against Israel, forcing it into a state of high-cost defensive readiness, a regional microcosm of the strategic exhaustion the plan seeks to induce globally [9].
The strategic intent behind Russia's deepening alliance with Iran has direct consequences for Israel. Russia's use of Iranian Shahed drones in Ukraine provides Tehran with invaluable battlefield data, allowing them to refine the very weapons systems that are pointed at Israel via Hezbollah [10]. This reality forces Israel into a difficult balancing act. The stated Israeli policy since February 2022 has been one of formal condemnation of the invasion of Ukraine but a refusal to provide lethal military aid [11]. This is driven by the strategic necessity of deconflicting with Russian forces in Syria to continue striking Iranian targets. The systemic impact of this is a perceived neutrality that creates friction with Western allies. The primary beneficiary is the Minimiser axis, which gains military capability and geopolitical leverage simultaneously.
An alternative, more provocative analysis, framed through the Minimisation Plan's lens of deception, posits that the conflict in the Middle East functions as a second, more active "bait" to accelerate U.S. strategic exhaustion. In this scenario, the conflict is not an unforeseen crisis but a co-opted and engineered one. The premise is that Minimiser actors have successfully subverted the West's long-standing strategic objective of controlling the Middle East, transforming it into a Middle Eastern plan to control the West. This is achieved by weaponizing the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, with both Iran and potentially compromised elements within Israel acting in ways that ultimately serve the Minimiser's grand strategy, using the Palestinian people as strategic hostages to guarantee Western engagement.
The core of this premise is that the conflict is maintained in a state of perpetual, managed crisis. Iran, a key Minimiser proxy, arms and funds groups like Hamas with the stated intent of "liberating" Palestine, knowing full well these actions will provoke a devastating Israeli military response. From a Minimiser perspective, the actual liberation of Palestine is not the strategic goal; the goal is the response itself. This tactic creates the "Bait": a violent attack on Israel that makes Western military and financial support for its "self-defense" an unavoidable political necessity.
The conflict then allows Israel to frame its subsequent military operations in Gaza as a necessary war against terror, effectively blaming the hostages for their own situation by fighting back. This creates the "Cover" for a large-scale military operation that the West is roped into supporting. The "True Intent," in this analytical framework, is to bog the United States down. The cost to the US since October 2023 has been immense, mirroring the resource drain seen with the Taiwan bait. It has involved the deployment of multiple aircraft carrier strike groups, at an operational cost of hundreds of millions of dollars per month, and the expenditure of over $1 billion in munitions in the first few months of operations against Houthi forces alone [12, 13].
The ultimate strategic goal, according to this pretext, is to create a moral and political catastrophe for the West. By supporting the Israeli response, the West becomes complicit in a conflict characterized by immense civilian casualties. This provides the Minimiser axis with an unparalleled propaganda victory, allowing them to frame Western democracy not as a defender of human rights, but as an enabler of oppression—a monstrous hypocrisy that makes it look like "Hitler times 9/11." This achieves the "Reputation Flip" on a global scale, particularly in the Global South, solidifying the Minimiser narrative that the "rules-based order" is a sham. The primary beneficiaries are the Minimiser axis and potentially hardline elements within both Iran and Israel whose power is solidified by the state of perpetual war. The primary victims are the Palestinian people, used as pawns in a global power game, and the Western democracies, who are bled of resources and moral authority.
A key piece of evidence for this pretext is the Minimiser tactic of interpreting "inaction after denouncement as actual approval trying to be hidden." Both Russia and China have publicly called for ceasefires and denounced the violence, yet have repeatedly used their veto power in the UN Security Council to block resolutions that would place significant pressure on Iran or its proxies, thereby ensuring the conflict continues [14]. This allows them to maintain a public façade of humanitarian concern while strategically benefiting from the West's ongoing entrapment.