This report provides a comprehensive analysis of the Australia-China relationship from 2010 to the present, examined through the strategic framework of the “Minimisation Plan.” Australia serves as a critical case study in this global influence campaign, representing a key “social battlefield” where the inherent tensions of a Western liberal democracy are exploited.1 The nation’s deep economic integration with the People’s Republic of China (PRC), a primary director of the Minimisation Plan, exists in direct conflict with its foundational security alliance with the United States. This strategic dichotomy makes Australia a focal point for the rhizomatic war, a multi-domain conflict fought not with conventional weapons but with narratives designed to erode institutional cohesion and sway the allegiance of the uncommitted majority, designated herein as “The Compliant”.1
The analysis within this document utilizes the core conceptual tools outlined in the foundational primers on the Minimisation Plan.1 Australian government actions are categorized according to their strategic effect. “Maximiser” vectors are those policies and initiatives that align with the principles of the “Greater Good”—constructive, cooperative actions aimed at mutual benefit, such as forging new trade agreements or participating in global climate initiatives. Conversely, actions that are perceived by Beijing as antagonistic, divisive, or strengthening alliances hostile to its interests are classified as “Minimiser” vectors. These typically involve enhancing security ties with the United States and its regional partners.1
The primary indicator of a Minimisation Plan counter-operation is the detection of the “hum.” The “hum” is defined as the disproportionate, often illogical, and strategically crafted reaction from Chinese state-controlled media and official channels in response to a given Australian action.1 The intensity, tone, and narrative content of this “hum” are not arbitrary; they are calibrated signals that reveal the strategic value the PRC places on the Australian action in question. These reactions are mapped using the Psochic Hegemony model, which assesses the moral and volitional nature of an idea or action.2 Maximiser actions, which seek to create new value for all, are plotted in the proactive, universal-benefit quadrant (
+υ,+ψ). Minimiser actions, particularly those strengthening security alliances, are consistently framed by the Chinese narrative apparatus as extractive and suppressive (plotted in the −υ,−ψ quadrant), designed to take from others and prevent China’s rise.2
The objective of this report is to construct a definitive timeline of this action-reaction chain. By cataloging Australian Maximiser and Minimiser vectors and meticulously analyzing the corresponding Chinese “hum,” this document identifies the consistent playbook of narratives deployed by Beijing. This analysis demonstrates how these narratives are used to manage the bilateral relationship, influence the Australian body politic, and ultimately advance the Minimisation Plan’s long-term goal of systematically eroding the cohesion of Western democracies.1
The period of governance under Prime Minister Julia Gillard, which also includes the brief second term of Kevin Rudd, is defined by a fundamental duality in its approach to the People’s Republic of China. On one hand, the Gillard government pursued deep economic and diplomatic engagement, representing clear Maximiser vectors aimed at fostering cooperation. On the other, it simultaneously undertook significant actions to strengthen Australia’s security alliance with the United States, which were perceived by Beijing as potent Minimiser vectors.3 This policy dichotomy produced a fluctuating “hum” from Beijing’s state-controlled media, offering a clear and invaluable baseline for understanding how the PRC calibrates its narrative response. The reactions during this era established the foundational themes of reward for economic cooperation and punishment for security alignment that would dominate the relationship for the next decade.
Australian Action: In February 2011, the Gillard government announced its plan to legislate a carbon pricing scheme, which was enacted as the Clean Energy Act 2011 and came into effect on 1 July 2012.4 This market-based mechanism was designed to combat climate change by imposing a price on carbon pollution for Australia’s largest emitters.5 Within the analytical framework of the Minimisation Plan, this policy represents a quintessential “Maximiser” vector. It is an action aimed at the “Greater Good,” aligning with global cooperative efforts to address a shared existential threat and promoting a more sustainable economic model.1
Chinese “Hum”: The direct reaction from official Chinese state media to Australia’s carbon price was notably subdued and pragmatic, in stark contrast to the heated domestic debate within Australia. The available evidence indicates that Beijing viewed the policy not as a threat, but as a valuable case study. There was a keen interest within Chinese policy circles in learning from Australia’s experience as the PRC contemplated its own emissions reduction strategies.6 During a visit to Australia, Vice Chairman Xie of China’s National Development and Reform Commission (NDRC), the country’s effective climate change minister, highlighted the “great potential for cooperation” between the two nations on this front and expressed that “China is willing to be open, frank and pragmatic and to exchange views and experiences”.6 This response constitutes a low-intensity, positive “hum” of encouragement and engagement, signaling that this particular Maximiser action was viewed favorably by Beijing.
Analysis: The Chinese reaction reveals a pragmatic and opportunistic approach. By framing Australia’s policy as a useful experiment, Beijing signaled its approval of this type of “Maximiser” action without committing to a similar path. This cooperative posture stands in sharp relief to the domestic Australian reaction, which was a textbook “Minimiser” counter-operation. As detailed in the Investigative Primer, a relentless media campaign, particularly by News Limited papers, successfully branded the policy a “carbon tax”.1 This campaign, funded by mining interests whose primary customer is China, was disproportionate and highly effective in turning public opinion—The Compliant—against the measure, ultimately leading to its repeal.1
The simultaneous operation of these two distinct “hums”—one positive and external, the other negative and internal—is a critical demonstration of the rhizomatic nature of the Minimisation Plan.1 The plan can operate on multiple fronts at once, often in seemingly contradictory ways. The Chinese state, as the external director, maintained a cooperative and respectable public stance, thereby preserving diplomatic goodwill and its image as a responsible global actor. Concurrently, domestic Australian actors whose financial interests were directly aligned with the PRC’s (specifically, the uninterrupted and low-cost export of resources) executed a highly disruptive internal narrative campaign. This two-pronged strategy allowed the Minimisation Plan to achieve its tactical objective—the elimination of a policy that would have increased the cost of Australian resources—without the state actor being overtly implicated in an act of hostile foreign interference. This dynamic perfectly illustrates the “Unbelievability Cloak,” where the sheer audacity and compartmentalization of the operation make it difficult for observers to connect the dots and recognize the coordinated nature of the campaign.1
Australian Action: In November 2011, during a visit by US President Barack Obama, Prime Minister Gillard announced an agreement to station US Marines on a rotational basis in Darwin, the capital of Australia’s Northern Territory.3 This decision was a central component of the Obama administration’s “Pivot to Asia,” a strategic rebalancing of US military and diplomatic assets toward the region.3 From the perspective of the Minimisation Plan framework, this is a quintessential “Minimiser” vector. It is a direct and material enhancement of the US-Australia military alliance, projecting American power into China’s immediate sphere of influence and strengthening the security architecture that Beijing perceives as a primary obstacle to its regional ambitions.1
Chinese “Hum”: The reaction from Beijing was immediate, coordinated, and hostile, marking the first major instance in this timeline of what would become a cornerstone narrative of the Chinese “hum”: encirclement. The Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) publicly criticized the move as “inappropriate” and asserted that it was “not … in the interest of countries within this region”.3 The state-controlled media amplified this official displeasure with more pointed and aggressive language. The
Global Times, a nationalistic tabloid published by the Communist Party’s People’s Daily, warned that Australia “cannot play China for a fool” and now risked being “caught in the crossfire” of a potential conflict between the US and China.3 A military analyst, Li Jie, writing in the
Global Times, provided the most explicit articulation of the encirclement narrative. He stated that the US base in Darwin would operate in conjunction with existing bases in Japan, South Korea, and Guam, and concluded with devastating bluntness: “It is moving toward encircling China”.11 This narrative was designed to frame a defensive alliance posture as an aggressive act of containment.
Analysis: The “encirclement hum” serves two primary strategic purposes for the Minimisation Plan. First, it functions as a tool of “manufactured justification”.1 By framing any enhancement of the US alliance system as an act of aggression, Beijing creates a public pretext for its own military expansion and assertive behavior in contested areas like the South China Sea. The narrative effectively shifts the blame for rising regional tensions onto the US and its allies, portraying China’s actions as a necessary and defensive response to Western provocation. Second, this narrative is aimed at creating division within the region. It seeks to persuade neighboring countries—The Compliant on a regional scale—that Australia is not an independent actor but a proxy for American aggression, a destabilizing force that invites great power conflict into their backyard.12
This event provides a clear example of how the Minimisation Plan manufactures the very problems it claims to be reacting to. The script is consistent: “Look how their alliances create tension and provoke conflict,” a narrative that is deployed while the PRC is simultaneously engaged in its own unprecedented military buildup and the creation of artificial islands in the South China Sea.1 The Darwin deployment, a relatively small rotational force, was seized upon and amplified by the Chinese media apparatus. It provided the perfect raw material to construct and disseminate a powerful narrative of decay, allowing Beijing to paint itself as the victim of a hostile Western containment strategy, thereby justifying its subsequent actions to a domestic and international audience.
Australian Action: In early 2012, the Gillard government made the decision to ban the Chinese telecommunications corporation Huawei from tendering for contracts to build Australia’s National Broadband Network (NBN).14 The decision was made on the grounds of national security, following advice from the Australian Security Intelligence Organisation (ASIO) regarding concerns that Huawei’s equipment could compromise the integrity of this critical national infrastructure.3 This was a direct “Minimiser” action, prioritizing sovereign security and the integrity of digital infrastructure over the potential economic benefits of engaging with a key Chinese corporate champion.
Chinese “Hum”: While direct, official government quotes from 2012 are limited in the available materials, the pattern of the “hum” is clear and consistent with later, more public reactions. The decision led to a significant increase in bilateral tensions.3 Crucially, sources within Huawei communicated to the media that the Chinese government would “retaliate against Australia if the ban on the company’s participation is not lifted”.16 This introduction of a direct threat of economic coercion is a key feature of the Minimiser “hum.” The accompanying narrative, which would be heavily amplified in subsequent years, was that the decision was not based on legitimate security concerns but was a form of politically motivated discrimination against a Chinese company.17 This narrative was supported by figures such as Alexander Downer, a former Australian foreign minister and then-board member of Huawei Australia, who dismissed the security concerns as “ridiculous” and based solely on the fact that “the company being Chinese”.14
Analysis: The “hum” in response to the NBN ban combines two core narrative tactics: the threat of economic punishment and a narrative of victimhood. The objective of this dual approach is to reframe a sovereign national security decision as an unfair, protectionist, and potentially Sinophobic act of economic warfare. The threat of retaliation is designed to directly pressure Australian policymakers by creating a tangible economic cost for their decision. Simultaneously, the victimhood narrative is aimed at influencing The Compliant, particularly within the Australian business and technology sectors, who may be more inclined to view the security concerns as overblown and who would bear the brunt of any retaliatory measures. By portraying Huawei as a victim of irrational prejudice, the “hum” seeks to build a domestic constituency within Australia that will advocate for a reversal of the policy, thereby serving Beijing’s interests.
Australian Action: In April 2013, during a state visit to China, Prime Minister Gillard secured a significant diplomatic upgrade in the bilateral relationship, establishing a “strategic partnership” (战略伙伴关系).3 This agreement was a landmark achievement, creating a formal architecture for high-level dialogue, including annual meetings between the Australian prime minister and the Chinese premier, as well as between other key economic and foreign affairs ministers.18 This action elevated Australia to a diplomatic level with Beijing on par with major powers like Russia and the UK, and was a clear “Maximiser” vector aimed at fostering deep cooperation, mutual respect, and institutionalized dialogue.3
Chinese “Hum”: The official Chinese reaction was overwhelmingly positive and widely publicized. The establishment of the partnership was officially hailed as raising the bilateral relationship to a “new level” and marking “milestones” in its development.18 During his meeting with Gillard, newly appointed President Xi Jinping spoke of fostering a strategic partnership built upon “mutual trust and mutual benefit”.20 The official statements from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and reports in state media were uniformly laudatory, creating a powerful “hum” of reward and encouragement.18 This positive narrative was so effective that the achievement garnered near-universal praise for Gillard within Australian policy and media circles.3
Analysis: Beijing’s response to the Strategic Partnership serves as a canonical example of a reward-based “hum.” The entire state media apparatus was mobilized to amplify the message that deep diplomatic and economic engagement is the correct and most beneficial path for Australia to pursue. This narrative is aimed squarely at The Compliant in Australia—policymakers, business leaders, and the public—reinforcing the idea that cooperation with China brings status, benefits, and international recognition.
The pattern that emerges from the Gillard era is a deliberate and calculated strategy of behavioral conditioning. The stark contrast between the hostile, threatening “hum” that followed the “Minimiser” actions of the Darwin deployment and the Huawei ban, and the effusive, laudatory “hum” that followed the “Maximiser” action of the Strategic Partnership, is not coincidental. It reveals a deliberate strategy to create a clear cost-benefit structure for Australian policy choices. The implicit message communicated to The Compliant is simple and powerful: alignment with the United States on security matters brings conflict, tension, and regional instability. In contrast, deep engagement with China on diplomatic and economic terms brings praise, elevated status, and mutual prosperity. This represents a long-term narrative campaign designed to gradually pull Australia’s strategic orientation away from its traditional alliance with Washington and into a closer orbit around Beijing, a core objective of the Minimisation Plan in the Australian theatre.
The prime ministership of Tony Abbott was characterized by stark and often jarring contradictions in its China policy. On one hand, the Abbott government pursued the ultimate “Maximiser” economic objective: the finalization of the long-stalled China-Australia Free Trade Agreement (ChAFTA).21 On the other, it engaged in a series of “Minimiser” security and diplomatic actions that provoked an intensely hostile and personal “hum” from Beijing, most notably through its significant strengthening of the strategic relationship with Japan.23 This period is perhaps best encapsulated by Abbott’s own leaked private comment to German Chancellor Angela Merkel, in which he described Australia’s China policy as being driven by “fear and greed”.23 This moment of accidental candor perfectly articulated the core strategic dilemma that the Minimisation Plan is designed to exploit: the tension between economic opportunity and security anxiety.
Australian Action: After nearly a decade of stalled negotiations under previous governments, the Abbott government designated the finalization of a comprehensive free trade agreement with China as a primary foreign policy objective.23 Following his first meeting with President Xi Jinping in October 2013, Abbott declared his intention to conclude the deal within twelve months.23 This intensive effort, led by Trade Minister Andrew Robb, culminated in the conclusion of negotiations in November 2014 and the formal signing of the China-Australia Free Trade Agreement (ChAFTA) in Canberra on 17 June 2015.22 This agreement was the single most significant “Maximiser” economic action of the decade, designed to dramatically liberalize trade and investment between the two nations.21
Chinese “Hum”: The official Chinese “hum” in response to the finalization and signing of ChAFTA was euphoric. The reaction represented the apex of positive narrative reinforcement from Beijing. In a congratulatory message, President Xi Jinping hailed the agreement as a “paradigm of regional economic integration” and a testament to the “fruitful results in economic and trade cooperation” between the two countries.30 Official state media outlets like
Xinhua and the People’s Daily celebrated ChAFTA as a “landmark” and “historic” agreement that was “proof of Australia’s trust in China”.30 The Chinese government’s official statement highlighted that, of all FTAs involving China, this one boasted “the highest level of overall trade and investment liberalization”.31 Even the typically more hawkish
Global Times reported positively, noting the “fruitful outcomes” and the potential for upgraded cooperation under the agreement.32 This was the “hum” at its most powerful and positive, a clear and unambiguous signal of reward for Australia’s commitment to deep economic integration.
Analysis: The response to ChAFTA serves as the canonical example of a reward-based “hum” within the Minimisation Plan’s playbook. Beijing utilized its entire state media apparatus to amplify a single, coherent message: deep economic partnership is the correct, most beneficial, and most valued path for Australia. This narrative was aimed squarely at The Compliant, especially the Australian business community and economic policymakers, powerfully reinforcing the “greed” component of Abbott’s “fear and greed” dichotomy. The overwhelming positivity of the “hum” was designed to create a strong domestic incentive structure within Australia, encouraging political and business leaders to prioritize economic opportunities with China above other considerations, particularly those related to security.
Australian Action: In parallel with its pursuit of ChAFTA, the Abbott government undertook a significant and highly public deepening of its strategic and defense relationship with Japan. Foreign Minister Julie Bishop repeatedly referred to Japan as Australia’s “best friend in Asia” and endorsed Japan’s military modernization program, a policy that China vigorously opposed.23 This strategic alignment culminated in a deeply symbolic and, from Beijing’s perspective, highly provocative moment in July 2014. During an address to the Australian parliament attended by Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe, Tony Abbott praised the “skill and the sense of honour” of Japanese submariners who were killed during a raid on Sydney Harbour in 1942.34 This act of strengthening ties with a key regional rival and major US ally, combined with what was perceived as a whitewashing of Japan’s wartime history, constituted a powerful “Minimiser” vector.
Chinese “Hum”: The “hum” from Beijing was immediate, intensely personal, and vitriolic. It represented a shift from the strategic and geopolitical criticism seen during the Gillard era to a narrative based on moral outrage and historical grievance. China’s official news agency, Xinhua, slammed Abbott’s remarks as “appalling and insensible,” and took the deliberate step of reminding its audience that the “skills” of the Japanese military also included the “skills to loot, to rape, to torture and to kill”.23 The commentary explicitly stated that Abbott’s praise was insensitive to the millions who suffered under Japanese aggression.34 The
Global Times was even more aggressive and ad hominem. An English-language editorial dismissed Abbott’s remarks as an “outrage” and, in a classic whataboutism tactic, attacked Australia’s own human rights record, stating its history was “not short of records of human rights infringement on the Aboriginal population”.35 The Chinese-language version of the same editorial was more blunt, referring to Australia’s “filthy record” and labeling Foreign Minister Julie Bishop an “idiot” for her own comments about China.35
Analysis: This incident provides a clear example of the “hum” being weaponized through the selective use of historical grievance. By invoking the atrocities of World War II, Beijing reframed Australia’s contemporary strategic alignment with Japan not as a pragmatic foreign policy choice, but as a profound moral failing and a direct insult to the victims of Japanese imperialism, chief among them China. This narrative is designed to be emotionally potent, to drive a wedge between Australia and its Asian neighbors, and to isolate Canberra by painting it as historically ignorant and morally bankrupt.
The contrast between the reactions to ChAFTA and the Japan relationship reveals a sophisticated hierarchy within the Minimisation Plan’s narrative playbook. The response is not monolithic; it is tailored to the specific perceived offense. The US alliance is treated as a strategic threat, so the “hum” is geopolitical, centered on themes of “encirclement” and “Cold War mentality.” The Japan alliance, however, was framed as a moral offense, allowing for the deployment of a more visceral and historical “hum” centered on themes of “insulting victims” and ignoring war crimes. The strategic “hum” aims to make Australia appear to be a foolish pawn in America’s game. The moral “hum” aims to make Australia appear to be an amoral actor, callously disregarding the deep wounds of regional history. Both narratives serve the same ultimate goal: to delegitimize Australia’s sovereign foreign policy choices in the eyes of The Compliant, both domestically and across the region. This demonstrates a nuanced understanding of narrative warfare, where the line of attack is chosen not randomly, but for its maximum potential to generate outrage, confusion, and division. The personal and historical nature of the attack on Abbott was chosen because it was the most potent weapon available in that specific context.
The prime ministership of Malcolm Turnbull marked a significant turning point in Australia’s strategic posture towards the People’s Republic of China. While the economic relationship established by ChAFTA continued to be a central pillar, the government’s policy focus shifted decisively towards countering perceived internal and external threats emanating from Beijing.36 This period was defined by the introduction of foundational “Minimiser” legislation and landmark decisions designed to protect Australia’s sovereignty and critical infrastructure. These actions elicited a coordinated, sustained, and increasingly hostile “hum” from Beijing, which began to systematically deploy a narrative playbook aimed at delegitimizing Australia’s defensive measures as acts of prejudice and aggression.
Australian Action: In December 2017, the Turnbull government introduced a comprehensive package of legislation aimed at countering foreign interference and espionage. Announcing the new laws, Prime Minister Turnbull explicitly referenced “disturbing reports about Chinese influence” as a key motivator for the reforms.37 The legislation included a ban on foreign political donations and created a transparency scheme requiring individuals and entities acting on behalf of foreign powers to register publicly.38 This was a direct and unprecedented “Minimiser” action, a sovereign move to harden Australia’s democratic institutions against the covert influence operations central to the Minimisation Plan.
Chinese “Hum”: Beijing’s reaction was a swift and coordinated campaign of furious denial and counter-accusation. The Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesman urged Australia to “discard prejudice” and dismissed the concerns as being based on reports that were “made up out of thin air and filled with cold war mentality and ideological bias”.38 The Chinese Embassy in Canberra escalated the rhetoric, accusing the Australian government and media of whipping up “anti-China hysteria” and engaging in “paranoid” behavior.39 A particularly sharp point of contention was Turnbull’s use of the phrase, “the Australian people stand up,” delivered in both English and Mandarin. This was a deliberate co-opting of a phrase attributed to Mao Zedong upon the founding of the PRC, which symbolized the end of a “century of humiliation” and foreign occupation. Beijing perceived this as a profound and deliberate insult, and the remark was met with “fury” in official and academic circles in China.40
Analysis: The “hum” deployed in response to the foreign interference laws is a classic example of a Minimiser narrative tactic: the “Victimhood Reversal.” In this maneuver, the actor accused of malign activity (China) aggressively reframes itself as the victim of baseless, prejudiced, and irrational accusations. The narrative’s goal is to shift the focus away from the evidence of interference and onto the alleged motives of those proposing the defensive measures. By labeling the legislation as a product of “hysteria,” “prejudice,” and a “Cold War mentality,” the “hum” seeks to delegitimize the laws themselves. This is a powerful tactic designed to influence The Compliant by making the act of defending sovereign institutions appear to be an act of bigotry or xenophobia, thereby silencing legitimate debate and creating political pressure to weaken or abandon the protective measures.
Australian Action: In August 2018, the Turnbull government formally announced that telecommunications companies “who are likely to be subject to extrajudicial directions from a foreign government” would be banned from participating in Australia’s 5G mobile network rollout.17 While not naming the companies explicitly, the directive effectively banned Chinese firms Huawei and ZTE from the project. This decision, building on the precedent of the 2012 NBN ban, was a critical “Minimiser” vector aimed at securing Australia’s future critical communications infrastructure from potential foreign state control.42
Chinese “Hum”: The “hum” was immediate, intense, and followed a now well-established script. The Chinese Foreign Ministry expressed “serious concerns” and demanded that the Australian government “abandon ideological prejudices and provide a fair competitive environment for Chinese companies”.41 The Ministry of Commerce issued a statement warning Australia not to “easily interfere with and restrict normal business activities in the name of national security”.42 The
Global Times provided the most aggressive rhetoric, publishing an English-language editorial titled “Canberra stabs Huawei in the back,” which contained a direct threat: “those who wilfully hurt Chinese companies with an excuse of national security will meet their nemesis”.42 In subsequent commentary, the Chinese Ambassador to Australia, Cheng Jingye, consistently framed the ban as being “politically motivated” and a clear act of “discrimination against the Chinese company”.17
Analysis: The “hum” surrounding the 5G ban solidified the narrative playbook that Beijing deploys in response to technology-related “Minimiser” actions. This multi-pronged narrative strategy is designed to attack the decision from every conceivable angle—moral, political, and economic—in order to maximize pressure on the target government and sway the opinion of The Compliant. The key themes of this playbook are:
This comprehensive narrative attack demonstrates the sophistication of the Minimisation Plan’s information warfare capabilities. It is not merely a reactive complaint but a proactive campaign to shape the information environment, create domestic division, and impose a political cost for policies that run counter to Beijing’s strategic interests.
The prime ministership of Scott Morrison represents the nadir of modern Australia-China relations and the period in which the hostile “hum” from Beijing reached its peak intensity and volume. A series of high-profile “Minimiser” actions undertaken by the Morrison government were met with unprecedented rhetorical hostility from Chinese officials and state media. Crucially, this period saw the Minimisation Plan escalate beyond narrative warfare into overt and widespread economic coercion, demonstrating the final and most punitive stage of the action-reaction chain.45 The “hum” was no longer just a signal of displeasure; it became the direct prelude to tangible punishment.
Australian Action: In April 2020, as the COVID-19 pandemic was escalating globally, Prime Minister Scott Morrison became the first world leader to publicly and persistently call for an independent international inquiry into the origins of the virus.46 While the Australian government framed this as a reasonable and necessary public health measure to prevent future pandemics, it was perceived in Beijing as a direct political attack, a “Minimiser” vector designed to assign blame to China for the global crisis and align Australia with the more confrontational stance of the United States.48
Chinese “Hum”: The reaction from Beijing was extraordinarily hostile, personal, and derogatory. The Chinese Ambassador to Australia, Cheng Jingye, took the unusual step of publicly threatening a widespread consumer boycott, suggesting that ordinary Chinese people might ask, “‘Why should we drink Australian wine? Eat Australian beef?’”.46 This threat was immediately amplified by the state media apparatus. The editor of the
Global Times, Hu Xijin, published an infamous and widely circulated comment describing Australia as “gum stuck on the sole of China’s shoes. Sometimes you have to find a stone to rub it off”.47 The paper accused Australia of “panda bashing,” “victim blaming,” and engaging in “adventurism” that could damage the bilateral relationship “beyond repair”.48 This intensely derogatory “hum” was not merely rhetorical; it was immediately followed by concrete action. China suspended imports from four major Australian beef abattoirs and moved to impose crippling anti-dumping tariffs of over 80% on Australian barley, directly linking the narrative attack to economic punishment.49
Analysis: This sequence of events provides the clearest available example of the “hum” functioning as a direct precursor to economic warfare. The shift in language from the strategic or political (e.g., “Cold War mentality”) to the openly derogatory and dehumanizing (“gum on shoe”) was a critical signal. This was not just an insult; it was a strategic act of delegitimization, designed to justify the subsequent economic coercion to both a domestic Chinese audience and the international community. It established a narrative in which Australia was not a responsible global citizen seeking answers, but an insignificant and irritating pest that deserved to be punished.
This episode reveals a clear escalation ladder within the Minimisation Plan’s operational doctrine. For years, the “hum” in response to “Minimiser” actions had consisted of hostile rhetoric and veiled or explicit threats of retaliation. The call for a COVID-19 inquiry, however, was perceived as such a significant and politically sensitive challenge that it triggered an escalation from the information domain to the economic domain. The intensity and nature of the “hum” can therefore be used as a predictive indicator. The transition from strategic language to openly contemptuous and dehumanizing language signaled that a critical threshold had been crossed and that kinetic action—in this case, economic—was imminent. This provides a crucial diagnostic tool for analysts seeking to anticipate the PRC’s responses to future provocations.
Australian Action: In September 2021, the Morrison government, alongside the United States and the United Kingdom, announced the formation of the AUKUS security pact. The centerpiece of the agreement was a plan for Australia to acquire a fleet of conventionally-armed, nuclear-powered submarines.51 This was arguably the most significant “Minimiser” military and strategic action taken by Australia in the post-Cold War era, cementing its defense posture and technological integration within the US alliance system for decades to come.
Chinese “Hum”: The “hum” from Beijing was severe, sustained, and multi-faceted, representing a masterclass in Minimiser narrative deployment. The Chinese Foreign Ministry immediately condemned the pact, accusing the three nations of “seriously undermining regional peace and stability, intensifying the arms race and undermining international non-proliferation efforts”.51 The spokesperson labeled the transfer of nuclear submarine technology to a non-nuclear state as “extremely irresponsible”.52 The
Global Times provided the most bellicose commentary, framing AUKUS as an “Anglo-Saxon clique” driven by an “obsolete cold war zero sum mentality”.52 It also issued a direct and chilling threat, warning that if Australia acted assertively, “Australian troops are also most likely to be the first batch of western soldiers to waste their lives in the South China Sea”.52 The narrative that Australia was merely a “pawn” of the United States, sacrificing its sovereignty for American interests, was also heavily pushed.53
Analysis: The AUKUS “hum” was a comprehensive information campaign designed to attack the pact from multiple angles and discredit it in the eyes of different audiences. The key narrative lines included:
This multi-layered “hum” demonstrates a sophisticated effort to shape the regional information environment against AUKUS, leveraging fears of nuclear proliferation, arms races, and great power conflict to undermine the pact’s legitimacy.
Australian Action: In December 2021, the Morrison government announced it would join the United States in a diplomatic boycott of the 2022 Beijing Winter Olympics. The decision was explicitly linked to concerns over “human rights abuses in Xinjiang” and Beijing’s refusal to engage in dialogue with Australian officials on these issues.55 This was a “Minimiser” action in the diplomatic and moral domain, designed to signal disapproval of the PRC’s internal policies on a major international stage.
Chinese “Hum”: The “hum” in response to the boycott was one of carefully performative dismissal and ridicule. The official Foreign Ministry spokesperson, Wang Wenbin, tersely stated, “Whether they come or not, nobody cares”.55 The Chinese Embassy in Canberra echoed this, accusing Australian politicians of “political posturing” and suggesting that they had not been invited in the first place.55 The
Global Times editor, Hu Xijin, deployed a bizarre and memorable analogy, comparing the diplomatic boycott to “the chicken feet that they eat when drinking”—a worthless, meatless snack for a drunkard. He described the boycott as a “fiasco” and a “little chicken foot,” concluding that “Only a drunkard would see it as a meal and eat it up with such relish”.57
Analysis: This “hum” of ridicule represents a distinct tactic within the Minimiser playbook. When faced with a symbolic action that cannot be easily stopped or retaliated against without appearing petty and validating the protest, the narrative strategy shifts to trivializing the action itself. The goal is to strip the boycott of its intended moral and political significance. By portraying the decision as a foolish, irrelevant, and pathetic gesture, the “hum” aims to create the impression that the protest has failed and is having no impact. This narrative is designed to discourage other countries (The Compliant) from joining the boycott and to reassure a domestic audience that China’s international standing remains unaffected.
The election of the Albanese government in May 2022 marked a deliberate strategic shift in the tone and methodology of Australia’s China policy. By prioritizing a “Maximiser” vector of “stabilisation” and the resumption of high-level dialogue, Canberra successfully induced a corresponding and immediate moderation in the official Chinese “hum”.58 This shift demonstrated the transactional nature of Beijing’s narrative machine. However, a deeper analysis reveals that while the surface-level “hum” has quieted on economic and diplomatic fronts, the underlying hostile Minimiser narratives remain potent and are readily deployed whenever core Australian security policies, such as AUKUS and the defense of the status quo in Taiwan, are addressed.
Australian Action: Upon taking office, the Albanese government immediately signaled a change in approach from the confrontational rhetoric of its predecessor. Foreign Minister Penny Wong and Prime Minister Anthony Albanese framed the new policy as one of “stabilisation,” emphasizing the need to “cooperate where we can, disagree where we must”.59 This “Maximiser” vector was put into practice through the swift resumption of high-level ministerial and leader-level meetings, which had been frozen for several years, culminating in Albanese’s visit to Beijing in 2023.58
Chinese “Hum”: The official “hum” from Beijing underwent a dramatic and positive transformation. The hostile and derogatory language of the Morrison era was replaced with a narrative of renewed cooperation. Chinese Premier Li Qiang publicly praised Prime Minister Albanese for his “personal efforts” in bringing the relationship back from a “low point” and returning it to the “right track of stability and development”.61 Chinese state media consistently echoed this theme, hailing the renewed dialogue as a sign of a “mutually beneficial joint outcome” and a return to “win-win cooperation”.62 This response is a clear “hum” of reward, mirroring the positive reception given to the Gillard government’s Strategic Partnership and the Abbott government’s finalization of ChAFTA.
Analysis: This sequence clearly demonstrates the transactional and highly responsive nature of the Chinese “hum.” A change in Australian rhetoric and diplomatic posture was immediately met with a corresponding change in the tone and content of Chinese state media. This serves a dual purpose for the Minimisation Plan. First, it directly rewards the Albanese government’s approach, providing positive reinforcement for its “stabilisation” policy. Second, it sends a powerful message to The Compliant within Australia—the business community, academia, and the public—that this new, less confrontational path is the “correct” one for restoring economic benefits and reducing geopolitical tension.
Australian Action: Despite the overarching policy of “stabilisation,” the Albanese government has not reversed any of the substantive “Minimiser” security policies of its predecessors.63 It has remained fully committed to the AUKUS security pact and the acquisition of nuclear-powered submarines. Furthermore, it has consistently maintained Australia’s long-standing, bipartisan position on Taiwan: supporting the “status quo” and opposing any unilateral change to it by either side.61
Chinese “Hum”: On these core security issues, the hostile “hum” persists, albeit often as a strategic undercurrent rather than the dominant public narrative. Beijing continues to wage a sustained diplomatic and media campaign to discredit AUKUS, variously labeling Australia as a “pawn” of the United States, warning of a regional arms race, and raising unfounded concerns about nuclear proliferation.66 Regarding Taiwan, the “hum” has employed more subtle information operations. Following the 2023 meeting between Albanese and Xi Jinping, Chinese state media reports deliberately misrepresented Australia’s position. They claimed that Albanese had stated Australia “does not support Taiwan’s independence,” a subtle but critical distortion of Australia’s actual policy, which is to not support
unilateral changes to the status quo from either side.61 This reframing falsely implies a shift in Australia’s position closer to that of Beijing.
Analysis: This dynamic reveals the clear limits of the “stabilisation” policy. While Beijing is willing to moderate the “hum” on economic and general diplomatic fronts as a reward for de-escalation, it will continue to deploy hostile and manipulative narratives on what it considers non-negotiable core security interests. The misrepresentation of Albanese’s Taiwan stance is a classic Minimiser information tactic, designed to create ambiguity, sow confusion, and falsely signal to a global audience that Australia’s strategic alignment is weakening.
The Albanese era demonstrates that “stabilisation” has not ended the narrative war; it has merely changed the battlefield conditions. The Minimisation Plan is highly adaptable. It can simultaneously project a positive “hum” of cooperation on economic matters while running a negative, manipulative “hum” on security matters. This bifurcated approach represents a more complex form of behavioral conditioning. Beijing is attempting to strategically “split” Australian policy, rewarding the economic half while continuing to punish and undermine the security half. The long-term objective of this dual-track “hum” is to progressively increase the political and economic cost of Australia’s security alliance with the United States. By making cooperation in profitable areas appear contingent on concessions in security, Beijing pressures Canberra to de-emphasize or decouple its security posture from its economic relationship. This serves the Minimisation Plan’s core objective of eroding the institutional and political cohesion of the Western alliance system.
The chronological analysis of the Australia-China relationship from 2010 to the present, viewed through the framework of the Minimisation Plan, reveals that the “hum” from Chinese state-controlled media is not a monolithic or purely emotional reaction. It is a sophisticated, calibrated, and adaptive toolkit of strategic narratives designed to condition Australian policy, influence public perception, and advance the PRC’s geopolitical objectives. The patterns identified over more than a decade of interactions are consistent, predictable, and provide a clear playbook for understanding Beijing’s information warfare doctrine.
The “hum” can be categorized into a distinct set of operational states, each deployed in response to specific types of Australian actions:
Based on this established playbook, analysts can develop a predictive framework for anticipating the nature of the “hum” in response to future Australian actions. Any further deepening of the AUKUS pact or the US alliance will trigger the “encirclement” and “arms race” hum. Any high-profile Australian criticism of China’s human rights record will be met with the “prejudice” and “interference in internal affairs” hum. Any significant independent security action in the region will inevitably be met with threats and accusations of Australia being a “pawn” provoking conflict. Conversely, any major new economic or diplomatic initiative will be met with the positive “hum” of “win-win cooperation,” demonstrating the continued transactional nature of the relationship.
The battle for the allegiance of “The Compliant” in Australia is the central contest in this theatre of the rhizomatic war. The Minimisation Plan seeks to exploit the tension between economic prosperity and national security, using its narrative apparatus to amplify the perceived costs of the latter and the rewards of the former. For Australian policymakers and the public, understanding the consistent and predictable patterns of the “hum” is the first and most critical step in recognizing, inoculating against, and ultimately countering the narrative warfare of the Minimisation Plan.1
| Date/Period | Australian Prime Minister | Australian Action | Classification (Vector) | Chinese Media/Official Reaction (“The Hum”) | Key Themes/Narratives Deployed |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2011-2012 | Julia Gillard | Carbon Pricing Mechanism 4 | Maximiser | Positive/Neutral: Viewed as a learning opportunity; potential for cooperation.6 | Pragmatism, Scientific Cooperation. |
| Nov 2011 | Julia Gillard | Stationing of US Marines in Darwin 3 | Minimiser | Hostile: MFA called it “inappropriate”; Global Times warned Australia could be “caught in the crossfire”.3 | Encirclement, Cold War Mentality, Regional Destabilisation. |
| Early 2012 | Julia Gillard | Ban on Huawei from NBN 14 | Minimiser | Hostile: Threats of government retaliation communicated via Huawei sources.16 | Discrimination, Unfair Treatment, Politicisation of Business. |
| Apr 2013 | Julia Gillard | Establishment of Strategic Partnership 3 | Maximiser | Highly Positive: Hailed as a “milestone” and “new level” of “mutual trust and mutual benefit”.18 | Win-Win Cooperation, Mutual Respect, Partnership. |
| 2014-2015 | Tony Abbott | Finalization of ChAFTA 21 | Maximiser | Euphoric: Hailed as a “paradigm,” “landmark,” and “historic” agreement by President Xi and state media.30 | Economic Integration, Mutual Trust, Shared Prosperity. |
| July 2014 | Tony Abbott | Praise for WWII Japanese military & strengthened defense ties 34 | Minimiser | Vitriolic/Moral: Xinhua called it “appalling and insensible”; Global Times called it an “outrage” and referred to Foreign Minister Bishop as an “idiot”.34 | Historical Grievance, Insult to Victims, Moral Failing. |
| 2017-2018 | Malcolm Turnbull | Foreign Interference Legislation 37 | Minimiser | Hostile/Delegitimizing: Accusations of “prejudice,” “Cold War mentality,” and “anti-China hysteria”.38 | Victimhood Reversal, Baseless Accusations, Racism/Sinophobia. |
| Aug 2018 | Malcolm Turnbull | Ban on Huawei/ZTE from 5G Network 17 | Minimiser | Hostile/Delegitimizing: Global Times warns of a “nemesis”; MFA urges abandoning “ideological prejudices”.42 | Discrimination, Political Motivation, Harming Consumers. |
| Apr 2020 | Scott Morrison | Call for independent COVID-19 inquiry 46 | Minimiser | Derogatory/Coercive: Described Australia as “gum on shoe”; followed by trade sanctions on beef and barley.47 | Denigration, Blame-Shifting, Overt Economic Coercion. |
| Sep 2021 | Scott Morrison | AUKUS Security Pact announced 51 | Minimiser | Hostile/Strategic: Accusations of an “arms race,” nuclear proliferation, and forming an “Anglo-Saxon clique”.51 | Encirclement, US Puppetry, Arms Race, Nuclear Threat. |
| Dec 2021 | Scott Morrison | Diplomatic boycott of Beijing Olympics 55 | Minimiser | Dismissive/Ridicule: “Nobody cares”; boycott compared to worthless “chicken feet for a drunkard”.55 | Trivialization, Performative Indifference, Political Posturing. |
| 2022-Present | Anthony Albanese | Policy of “Stabilisation” and renewed dialogue 58 | Maximiser | Positive: Hailed as returning to the “right track of stability and development”.61 | Return to Normalcy, Win-Win Cooperation, Pragmatism. |
| 2022-Present | Anthony Albanese | Continued commitment to AUKUS & Taiwan status quo 61 | Minimiser | Hostile (Undercurrent): Continued campaign against AUKUS; misrepresentation of Taiwan policy.61 | US Puppetry, Arms Race, Falsifying Diplomatic Positions. |